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Title: Proxy voting policies as tools for shareholder engagement in CSR: an exploratory 
study 
Suggestion of short running title: Proxy voting policies and CSR 
 
Abstract- This paper presents an exploratory study on proxy voting policies as a lever for 
social shareholder engagement (SSE). It proposes an analysis framework for an ongoing 
empirical research and produces its first results of investigation. Although SSE is a growing 
phenomenon, it needs more concrete means of action. If the influence of shareholder activists 
is frequently denounced for its negative impact on corporations, which concrete means 
shareholders who want CSR to benefit from their leverage have at their disposal? While in 
Europe shareholder proposals are limited, proxy voting policies appear as a significant 
element which has been insufficiently explored in the SSE literature. Starting with a first 
sample of proxy voting policies, we examine the potential use of voting policies by engaged 
shareholders. Our analysis shows limited differentiation and we search for some first 
hypotheses that could lead and support further research. 
Keywords: proxy voting policies; proxy voting; shareholder engagement; corporate 










Social Shareholder Engagement (SSE) has been acknowledged as a major topic in the 
academic literature as well as in shareholder practices. On the ground, socially engaged 
shareholders are already taking up the challenge of new and responsible corporations. In 
Europe, there are almost € 2 trillion of assets hold by this category of shareholders (Eurosif, 
2012). In the literature, Social Shareholder Engagement-SSE (Goodman and al., 2014) is 
commonly considered as one of the strategies a socially responsible investor can undertake 
(Hockerts and Moir, 2004). Thanks to the rights attached to share-ownership, this strategy 
takes up a minority position within corporate governance and aims at influencing the direction 
of firms in order to support social and environmental issues.  
Yet, little is known on concrete means of engagement and investors are now seeking new 
levers of action. The impact of SSE on Corporate Social Responsibility has not met its 
expectations (Marens, 2004; Rojas and al., 2009), the movement thus needs to conceive or 
rediscover better practices to enhance its weight (Gifford, 2010).  
In this exploratory research, we are studying how engaged shareholders can use their voting 
rights to influence corporations on their Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
practices. On the European market, proxy voting turns out to be a key element. Though many 
academic contributions focus on shareholder proposals and consider them as one of the most 
prominent tool of shareholder activism (Sjöström, 2008), this tool faces many legal and 
market constraints in Europe (Masouros, 2010). Voting then stands as the other significant 
action within the reach of shareholders (Sandberg, 2011).  
Shareholders are entitled to vote on issues put forward by the company or other shareholders 
at Annual General Meetings (AGMs). These issues take the legal form of resolutions. 
Shareholders can either vote in person and attend AGMs or resort to proxy agents. In the last 
case, they give their voting instructions regarding the proposed resolutions to these proxy 
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agents. The proxy agents then transmit these instructions to the issuer. Many asset 
management companies resort to these proxy agents. Asset managers produce their own proxy 
voting policy, which is mandatory for mutual funds in the United States (Rothberg and Mesa 
Graziano, 2004) and may be mandatory in every European Union State thanks to the 
amendment to the Directive 2007/36/EC adopted by the European Parliament in July 2015, 
regarding “the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement”. However proxy agents 
have professionalized proxy voting and the power of proxy advisory firms is significant on 
voting trends (Masouros, 2010). Publishing its own proxy voting policy is then a first 
engagement step towards independent voting.  
In this paper, we formed a first sample of voting policies from a small and contrasted group of 
asset management companies intervening on the European market. We have examined how 
their position differed and have looked for the main features of socially-engaged funds. We 
found out that there was little differentiation in practice. In the discussion, we attempt to path 
the way for some first explanations in order to frame further research. 
 
Social Shareholder Engagement and proxy voting policies 
SSE: starting with shareholder proposals 
The first textbook case of SSE starts with General Motors’ annual meeting of 1970, when a 
group of shareholders representing the Project for Corporate Responsibility put forward a 
shareholder proposal about GM’s social corporate performance (Vogel, 1983). This socially-
driven shareholder activism event follows multiple decades of shareholder activism. However 
the first shareholder activists of the early 20th century were mainly focused on corporate 
governance and control proposals (Marens, 2002).  
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GM’s annual meeting then forces to distinguish socially-driven shareholder activism, which 
has later been called Social Shareholder Engagement (Goodman and al, 2014), from 
financially-driven shareholder activism (Chung and Talaulicar, 2010).  
The following first contributions dealing specifically with SSE make a dent in the 
fundamentals of the conceptualisation of SSE. They report cases and trends of SSE (Graves, 
Rehbein and Waddock, 2001). They analyse management response to social shareholder 
activism (Hoffman, 1996), highlight the action of precise shareholder activists (Smith, 1996), 
study shareholder activism dealing with a specific social thematic (McCabe, 2000), and link 
SRI with social shareholder activism (Lewis and MacKenzie, 2000). This last article is also 
the first one to use the term “engagement” to describe social shareholder activism, calling it 
“active engagement” (Lewis and MacKenzie, 2000). 
SSE thus became a new lever activist could use to change the World (Den Hond and De 
Bakker, 2007; Waygood and Werhmeyer, 2003). Socially-driven shareholder proposals are 
identified as both a process and a tool to meet corporate social responsibility expectations 
(Haigh and Hazelton, 2004), as means to improve management’s accountability for 
stakeholders (McLaren, 2004) and human rights accountability (Dhir, 2006; Dhir, 2012), as a 
way of linking SRI and CSR (Sparks and Cowton, 2004), as a way of developing the SRI 
movement (Solomon and al., 2004), or as a type of SRI that can communicate CSR (Hockerts 
and Moir, 2004; Arjaliès, 2010; Viviers and Eccles, 2012). 
Some other tools such as advertising, public outreach, educational campaigns are mentioned 
as well (Tkak, 2006) but shareholder proposals stay prominent in the literature (Sjöström, 
2008). However, after the former enthusiasm of researchers, the concrete impact and outcome 
of these tools- shareholder proposals above all- appears to be quite poor (Marens, 2004; 
Deakin and Hobbs, 2007; Rojas and al., 2009). 
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At the opposite, some works insist on the positive effects shareholder activism can achieve on 
corporate environmental performance (Lee and Lounsbury, 2011; McAteern and Pulver, 
2009) or on transparency (Lozano, Albareda, Balaguer, 2006). Others have studied 
management responsiveness to shareholder activism and propose knowledge to prepare better 
shareholder proposals strategies (Vandekerckhove, Leys and Van Braeckeln, 2007; 
Vandekerckhove, Leys, Van Braeckel, 2008). David, Bloom and Hillman argue in particular, 
the impact on management is much more symbolic than substantive (David, Bloom and 
Hillman, 2007). Logsdon, Rehbein and Van Buren support a focus on “Dialogue” with 
management rather than focusing on the issue of the shareholder proposal process (Logsdon, 
Rehbein and Van Buren, 2007; Logdson and Van Buren, 2009).  
Shareholder proposals: comparing US and Europe 
Yet, even if we consider dialogue or symbolic achievements, the shareholder proposal process 
remains the only framework for shareholder engagement and most of these former studies are 
based upon North American empirical evidence and upon the US’s legal structure.  
Shareholder proposals in the US context comply with the specific legal background of the 
Securities and Exchange Act, in particular Rule 14-8. This 1934 rule defines the terms and 
conditions of proposing shareholder resolutions at annual meetings. The revision of this rule 
in 1998 can explain some of the success of shareholder proposals in the US (Campbell, 
Gillian and Niden, 1999). 
 From 1998, in the USA, in order to submit a shareholder proposal to an annual meeting, 
some conditions must be met. First of all, the 1998 revision has toughened the eligibility 
conditions. Shareholders submitting a proposal must have held at least $2000 or 1% of the 
company’s securities in market value for at least one year. They need to be able to prove 
ownership and they cannot submit more than one proposal each year. Secondly, there are 
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some limits to the area these proposals can cover. For instance, a shareholder proposal will 
not be received if it is improper under state law and it must be a recommendation or a request 
- non-binding for the company. It will not be received if it incites the company to violate the 
law, if it holds personal grievance, if it is not relevant in relation to the company’s business 
(operations accounting for less than 5% the company’s asset), nor if it deals with the 
company’s ordinary business operations. The company’s ordinary business operations are 
commonly considered to be management’s prerogative and for a long time have been the 
major argument brought against social shareholder proposals. This condition was smoothened 
in 1998, notably to ease proposal submission in relation to workplace-related social issues 
(Campbell and al., 1999). 
However, in a European context, the European Union threshold for putting an item on the 
annual meeting’s agenda is to own 5% of a company (Masouros, 2010). As mostly large 
blockholdings are represented on the European asset market for listed corporations, many 
minority shareholders – and potential socially engaged shareholders- are below this threshold 
and they face other ownership thresholds to determine who the other shareholders they could 
have associated with -to propose resolutions- are (Masouros, 2010). These legal barriers and 
market structure have been very dissuasive especially for minority shareholders (Martynova 
and Renneboog, 2008). 
Proxy voting and voting policies 
As mentioned earlier, voting is the second standard option for shareholder activism and the 
second step after submitting a proposal in the shareholder engagement process. At annual 
meeting, shareholders have the legal right to vote management resolutions and shareholder 
resolutions, when they occur.  
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The shareholder engagement process has been frequently modelled thanks to Hirschman’s 
options “Voice” and “Exit” (Hirschman, 1970). His analysis grid “Exit”, “Voice” and 
“Loyalty” is a common reference in the corporate governance literature since Louis 
Lowenstein applied it to investors’ behaviours in his famous book What’s wrong with Wall 
Street? (Lowenstein, 1988). Many authors from the shareholder engagement literature refer to 
this “Voice” and “Exit” grid (Lewis and Mackenzie, 2000; Clark and Hebb, 2004; Chung and 
Talaulicar, 2010; Goodman and al., 2014 among others).  
Shareholder engagement is part of the dynamics of the “Voice” alternative. While shareholder 
proposals clearly explain the views of one or a group of shareholders, shareholder voting 
reflects the views of the majority but it is limited to approval or disapproval. Voting policies 
thus broadens the range of shareholder voting, it gives substance to a “Yes” or “No” vote. 
Furthermore, voting policies can overcome some of the restraints weighing on shareholder 
voting. In Europe, shareholder voting does not have as much legal constraints as for 
shareholder proposals but companies can make accessing to the right information harder for 
shareholders (Masouros, 2010) and secondly the market infrastructure is such that many 
shareholders gave part of their voting rights to proxy advisors (Masouros, 2010). These proxy 
advisors have their own positions and their own guidelines on how to vote at annual meetings 
(Ertimur, Ferri, Oesch, 2013). These guidelines are mainly financially-driven.  
Hence, proxy voting policies appear as an interesting tool for engaged shareholders with 
diversified portfolios who cannot attend every AGMs of the companies in which they have 
interests.  They can give meaning to their vote and give them some room to manoeuvre even 





Proxy voting policies: a potential tool for CSR 
There is very little research dealing explicitly with proxy voting policies. The first two works 
to draw the attention on voting policies date from 1999. Fabris and Greink use voting policies 
as an analysis material to study the nature and the motives of the economic pressure fund 
managers can put on firms (Fabris and Greink, 1999). As for them, Aris Solomon and Jill 
Solomon view voting policies as means unit trust managers can grow activist features 
(Solomon and Solomon, 1999). 
A 2004 article studied the implications of the US 2003 Securities and Exchange Commission 
rule which binds mutual funds to publish their voting policies (Rothberg and Mesa Graziano, 
2004). This article exhibits the similarities of the voting rules mutual funds have chosen. The 
main goal of the 2003 SEC rule was to reduce conflicts of interest between mutual funds and 
firms. It stands as a guarantee that mutual funds will really vote against management’s 
proposals at annual meetings if the company does not meet their corporate governance 
standards. 
The impact of this rule on conflicts of interest was then analysed by Davis and Han Kim. 
They concluded there was no real evidence that mutual funds voted depending on their 
business ties with firms. However, up to them, the more mutual funds had “business ties” with 
firms they invested in, the less strict and demanding their voting policies were (Davis and Han 
Kim, 2007).  
Thereafter, two 2013 articles dealt with proxy advisors’ voting recommendations. As 
explained earlier, many shareholders hand down the exercise of their voting rights to proxy 
advisory agencies to which they give their voting instructions. In practice, the great majority 
of shareholders are passive. They adapt their own voting policy to the recommendations of 
these agencies. We can understand this phenomenon as a professionalization of proxy voting 
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guidelines as opposed to direct democratic shareholder voting rights. Ertimur, Ferri, Oesch 
compared the impact of the two main global proxy advisors, ISS and Glass Lewis’s 
recommendations (Ertimur, Ferri, Oesch, 2013), which came to be very similar as well as 
very salient in voting trends. At an economic level, Larcker, McCall, and Ormazabal 
examined the relevance of following proxy advisors voting recommendations. They 
concluded there was some significant doubt on their impact on shareholder value. (Larcker, 
McCall, and Ormazabal, 2013). The same ones also produced a working paper to analyse the 
influence of recommendations on “Say on pay” in voting policies on boards’ decisions 
(Larcker, McCall, Ormazabal, 20014). They found out that boards were anticipating these 
votes and thus complying in advance with proxy advisory firms’ recommendations. 
Hence, if voting rights are not legally that much protected and if the issue of the vote is 
mainly depending on proxy advisory firms’ guidelines, disclosing a socially engaged proxy 
voting policy could stand as a declaration of faith. Sjöström has been suggesting that socially-
driven shareholder activists are valuable as “norm entrepreneurs” (Sjöström, 2010) because 
even if they don’t have the power to bind companies to comply with their requests, they have 
the power of contributing to shape the CSR norms and values. We could view proxy voting 
policies in the same manner, as tools that assert what shareholders consider to be good 
“governance”.  
To this regard, we formulate the following research question:  
Q: Are the proxy voting policies of engaged and responsible shareholders supporting their 
engagement in corporate social responsibility?  





Is engagement in CSR influencing shareholders’ voting policy on the European market?  
Problematics and methodology 
The analysis of the academic literature raises expectations on the role proxy voting policies 
can undertake for SSE. We will now address the empirical evaluation of these expectations 
thanks to a first angle of investigation.  
To this regard, we have two sub-questions. The first one deals with the nomenclature of proxy 
voting policy. What are the matters covered by the voting policy of an engaged shareholder, 
does it differ from financially-driven shareholder activists? Our second question focuses on 
the positions engaged shareholders stand by. Are these positions significantly engaged in 
CSR?  
In order to address these issues, we formed a panel from a short sample of voting policies that 
are applied on the same market, the European market. This sample gathers the European or 
International voting guidelines of a proxy advisory firm, in this case ISS, of the first four top 
asset management companies in the World - Blackrock, Vanguard, SSGM and Allianz, of two 
World top European asset management companies – Amundi and Natixis, and of four socially 
engaged European asset management companies – Mirova, Ecofi, Federal Finance and 
Triodos. The funds of the last four companies were labeled as engaged funds by Novethic, an 
observation center and media which audits European funds and awards the responsible ones 
with a certification recognized and sought by field actors. These ten asset management 
companies all have in common of resorting to proxy agents for their voting instructions and of 
disclosing their proxy voting policies- which is not mandatory in every European country. 
The ISS voting guidelines was used for reference, because of the weight of these guidelines 
on proxy voting (Masouros, 2010). The six “classical” asset management companies represent 
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financially-driven shareholders and serve as comparison points for the four socially-driven 
shareholders.  
The test consists of two stages. Firstly, we compared the different taxonomies of the ten proxy 
voting policies at our disposal to the proxy advisor’s guidelines. The documents were 
heterogeneous in lengths and details. We thus sorted the items of these documents according 
to the reference document, ISS’s guidelines. Some items were withdrawn from our analysis 
when the degree of precision and technicity was too high compared to the great majority of 
the sample1. We kept the simple and general items which were conveying the company’s 
orientation on the shareholder voting main categories in the proxy advisor’s guidelines- 
operation voting process, board’s election, compensation, capital structure, audit-related items 
and social and environmental issues- as well as the items that were disregarded by these 
reference guidelines. Then, we compared and evaluated the recurrence of these items in our 
sample (See Table 2).  
In a second stage, we compared the orientations the asset management companies were taking 
on these items. In order to combine these various positions, we chose to code upon the 
functions they were fulfilling for shareholders. We notice 16 different functions. These 
functions can as well be summarised by two motives. The first category covers control 
motives, as in control for shareholder over management. The second category covers ethical 
motives such as taking into account long-term interests and stakeholder interests (See Table 
1). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1For instance, Natixis’s voting policy is very similar to Amundi’s voting policy in the main orientations but is 
much longer and much more detailed. We thus have neglected some detailed and technical situations in order to 
focus on comparable items and general corporate events.	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These two motives have already been pointed out by the literature on social shareholder 
engagement, as the confrontation of two competing theories, the shareholder approach of the 
agency theory and the stakeholder approach of the stakeholder model (McLaren, 2004; Guay 
and al., 2004; Goodman and Arenas, 2015 among others). The shareholder approach is linked 
to agency tenants such as Milton Friedman or Jensen and Meckling (Hoffman, 1996, Guay 
and al., 2004; Goodman and al., 2015.) whereas the stakeholder approach is linked to the 
stakeholder democracy tenants such as Freeman or Mitchell (Guay and al., 2004; Gifford, 
2010; Goodman and al., 2015). The agency theory and the shareholder approach assert that 
the only aim of shareholder should be to maximise shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). The stakeholder model which takes the opposite position, professes that corporations 
should consider the interests of all its stakeholders - the actors that they impact and who 
contribute to the collective projet of the corporation (Freeman, 1984; Mitchell and al., 1997).  
The functions and motives that we identified were then sorted between a shareholder 
approach- control and financial objectives- and a stakeholder approach - ethical and long-term 
motives. We could have chosen to classify these incentives thanks to our former distinction 
between socially-driven and financially-driven actors (Chung and Talaulicar, 2010), but it 
could have led to a confusion between socially-driven actions and social motives in one hand 
and financially-driven actors and financial motives on the other hand.  
The last step of this second stage was the association of a position- shareholder or stakeholder 







Analysis of the first results: stability of the nomenclature and relatively homogeneous 
positions tending to shareholder approach 
Issue 1: Proxy voting policies’ nomenclatures 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Our Table 2 resume the matters shareholders covered by shareholders and propose a 
recurrence percentage of the major items found in our sample of proxy voting policies. The 
first result is that voting policies have stable nomenclatures. Most items appeared in more 
than 50% of the voting policies.  
Some items are standing out such as auditing matters, allocation of dividends; amendments to 
articles of association, charters or bylaws; director election; board independence and 
attendance; executive compensation – say on pay; non-executive compensation; voting on 
social and environmental proposals and antitakeover mechanisms. All of them have an 
occurrence over 80% in our sample. We will use these specific items to discuss the diversity 
or homogeneity of positions of the proxy voting policies. 
Other items are standing out because of their very low occurrence2, in three or four of the 
voting policies of our sample, even if the matter covered would seem very important. For 
example, the item “employee representatives” is only covered by Natixis, Mirova and Ecofi. 
Mirova and Ecofi are both socially engaged shareholders, and Natixis is the parent company 
of Mirova which is the provider of Natixis’s own voting policy. There is also the 
accountability of directors on environmental and social matters which is only covered by 
Blackrock and Mirova. If Mirova engaged itself on ESG criteria (Environmental, Social and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  In italics in Table 2	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Governance), Blackrock is the world leading asset management company and a financially-
driven shareholder activist.  
As for now, regarding these first results, we can remark that there is little differentiation 
between the voting policies’ nomenclatures of socially-driven or financially-driven actors. 
Nonetheless we can observe that a controversial item such as employee representative (Fauver 
and Fuerst, 2006) occurs in the voting policies of two socially-engaged actors, and of one 
financially-driven actor which has with close relationships with an engaged actor. 
There is another remark we can make that doesn’t appear in the classification of our Table 2. 
The way a proxy voting policy is presented, as a formal document, can give some indications 
of the further positions of its author. For instance, the voting policy of Ecofi- a socially 
engaged shareholder- puts at the top of its voting policy the Environmental and Social items. 
On another hand, Mirova doesn’t have an “Environmental and Social” category. These items 
are scattered in each big category, which leads to think that ESG issues are everywhere. 
Issue 2: Proxy voting policies’ positions 
Thanks to our previous results, we can draw the attention on the elements on which 
shareholders are really attentive and/or on which they propose different positions. 
Our Table 3 displays these positions and codes them as either stakeholder approach3 or 
shareholder approach. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Several remarks can be made. First of all, the positions are also relatively homogeneous. The 
great majority of the positions are coded “shareholder approach” even for socially-driven 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  In bold and italics in Table 3	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shareholders. However, these socially-driven shareholders have more occurrences of 
stakeholder approach positions. To this regard, we can make new assumptions. Either these 
items do not lend themselves to differentiation or these socially-driven shareholders do not 
express their engagement in CSR through corporate governance recommendations.  In the 
second case, if there is a possibility of a differentiated position but that is not reflected in their 
proxy voting policies, we can assume that they lack knowledge on this differentiated position 
or that they choose to convey their views on CSR through different means.  
Secondly, we observed that some positions were not directly link with the original purpose of 
the items they were deciding on. For instance, Mirova determines its position on executive 
compensation depending on environmental and social performance. Executive compensation 
is usually defended in these proxy voting policies as a way of aligning shareholders’ and 
executives’ interests. Mirova, with a stakeholder approach, is requesting an alignment of 
stakeholders’ and executives’ interests.  Blackrock, on another hand, stands that it can vote 
against members at the board’s election if during the past year shareholder votes were not 
respected. Hence, it does not vote on whether the new or old directors are relevant choices for 
the company’s strategy. It punishes or threatens them for neglecting shareholders’ “Voice” 
(Goodman and al., 2014).  Last example, we introduced an item “antitakeover mechanisms” 
because it is presented this way in many voting policies, but most shareholders introduce 
these corporate governance debates around antitakeover mechanisms to take positions on 
other items. For instance, the great majority of the positions on the capital structure category, 
for instance increase in capital or reduction of capital, were determined depending on whether 
they were asked to vote on these resolutions in period of takeover bids. For instance, Natixis 
votes against the repurchasing of actions in periods of takeover bid.  
Regarding these lasts remarks, we can add two new assumptions that could lead to further 
inquiry. Some positions that stands out or items that stands out, such as employee 
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representative, comes from an implicit theory or opinions of these shareholders on that matter. 
We chose for this analysis to confront the agency and the stakeholder model. Yet, these two 
models aren’t comprehensive of all our observations because they do not explain why 
shareholders adopt one and then the other approach for some items. We can ask ourselves if 
some socially-engaged shareholders aren’t developing their own, however incomplete, theory 
on what is “good governance”. On a second hand, shareholders seem to be using standard 
items on which they have to position themselves at AGMs to better control management’s 
behaviour regarding other debates, other items, or other company strategies on which they 
aren’t directly asked to vote. This could open the spectrum and suggest further engagement of 
shareholders in a company’s “ordinary business matters”, even if they don’t have for now the 
legal framework or the usage legitimacy to do so.  
 
Conclusion 
We have presented in this paper an exploratory study on proxy voting policies as a lever for 
social shareholder engagement (SSE). SSE is a growing topic both in the literature and in 
practice, however there is a need for further investigation regarding concrete means of action. 
In Europe, there are some legal constraints on shareholder proposals and voting rights appear 
as a key element for shareholders who engage in CSR. Proxy voting policies can stand as a 
useful tool to support responsible voting practices for major shareholders who resort to proxy 
voting due to diversified portfolios. 
Our investigation proposes preliminary results on this matter. From a short sample of voting 
policies of diversified asset management companies intervening on the European market, we 
conducted a first test to determine the position and the features of socially engaged funds 
compared to financially-driven ones.  
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Our results show little differentiation but contribute to the framing of further research. First of 
all, the relative stability of proxy voting policies’ nomenclature and positions has led us to put 
forward new assumptions.  
H1: There is no real potential of differentiation within shareholder voting 
H2: Socially engaged shareholders have insufficient knowledge on the features of 
responsible governance that are not financially-driven 
H3: A responsible corporate governance do not discriminate between shareholder and 
stakeholder approach  
Second of all, regarding the few heterogeneous positions of shareholders, both financially and 
socially-driven shareholders, two other assumptions have emerged.   
H5: Stakeholder approach makes it way in the views of socially-engaged shareholder 
on corporate governance 
H6: Shareholders can make an indirect use of the rigid nomenclatures of proxy voting 
policies and proxy voting matters to put forward their own positions on larger, and 
sometimes controversial, matters.  
Hence, six new hypotheses ensue from this exploratory study that calls for further research 
linking proxy voting policies and socially engaged shareholder means of actions. This first 
framing could also contribute to some challenging researches for the theoretical 
conceptualisation of responsible corporate governance.  
There are some limits to our investigation that must be mentioned. Firstly, our test was run on 
a very limited and not exhaustive sample. It could be interesting to conduct the same test on a 
broader panel to compare the outcomes. Secondly, the proxy voting policies at our disposal 
18 
	  
were publicly disclosed documents. They cannot completely attest of the real practice of 
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Table	  1:	  The	  different	  drivers	  of	  shareholders’	  position	  
This	   table	   assigns	   to	   each	   functional	   driver	   of	   shareholders	   a	   specific	  motive	   –	   control	   or	  
ethics	  –	  regarding	  their	  positions	  on	  proxy	  voting	  policies	  items.	  	  
	  








Table	  2:	  The	  relative	  stability	  of	  proxy	  voting	  policies’	  nomenclatures	  
From	  the	  different	  occurrences	  of	  each	  proxy	  voting	  policies	  major	  items,	  this	  table	  gives	  a	  
percentage	  of	  recurrence	  for	  these	  items.	  We	  can	  observe	  that	  most	  percentages	  are	  above	  
50	  %.	  	  
	  
	  
Categories Items %	  of	  recurrence
Financial	  Results	  /	  Director	  and	  Audit	  Reports 73%
Appointment	  of	  Auditors	  and	  Auditos	  Fees 100%
Allocation	  of	  income	  (dividends) 82%
Amendments	  to	  article	  of	  association	  /	  charts	  /	  bylaws 91%
Bundled	  Proposals 64%
Director	  Election 100%
*	  Board	  independance 100%
*Disclosure	  of	  names	  of	  nominees 64%
*	  Combined	  Chairman	  and	  CEO 55%
*	  Overboarded	  Directors 73%
*	  Composition	  of	  the	  Board	  (skills/diversity) 64%
*	  Employee	  representatives 27%
*	  Composition	  of	  Committees 64%
*Attendance	  (Boards	  and	  Committees) 100%
Shareholder	  rights One	  share-­‐	  One	  vote 82%
General	  Issuance 73%
Specific	  Issuance 64%
	  Increases	  in	  Authorized	  Capital
73%
	  Reduction	  of	  Capital 55%
Executive	  compensation-­‐related	  proposals	  /	  Say	  on	  Pay 91%
Disclosure	  of	  performance	  criteria	  /	  Remuneration	  report 55%
Stock-­‐based	  compensation	  plans 73%
Bonus	  plans 64%
Executive	  severance	  agreements 64%
Non-­‐Executive	  Director	  Compensation	   91%
Equity	  based	  compensation	  proposals	  for
employee
73%
Voting	  on	  Social	  and	  Environmental	  Proposals 91%
Annual	  Reports 55%
Donations 36%
Accountability	  of	  Directors 18%
Governance	  structure 36%













	  Table	  3	  :	  Shareholders	  and	  stakeholder	  /	  shareholder	  approaches	  
This	   table	  points	  out	  the	  different	  approaches	  took	  by	  the	  shareholders	  taken	  from	  our	  sample	  for	  
each	   item	   and	   assigns	   them	   a	   shareholder	   or	   stakeholder	   approach.	   This	   table	   shows	   a	   real	  
prominence	  of	  the	  shareholder	  approach.	  However	  the	  socially	  engaged	  shareholders	  do	  show	  more	  
occurrences	  of	  stakeholder	  approach.	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